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Abstract: Why is it so easy to ignore the ecological and economic crises of the 
Anthropocene? This article unveils some of the religious biases whose covert operation 
facilitates the repression or rejection of warnings about the consequences of extreme 
climate change and excessive capitalist consumption. The evolved defaults that are most 
relevant for our purposes here have to do with mental credulity toward religious content 
(beliefs about supernatural agents) and with social congruity in religious contexts 
(behaviors shaped by supernatural rituals). Learning how to contest these phylogenetically 
inherited and culturally fortified biases may be a necessary condition for adapting to and 
altering our current natural and social environments in ways that will enhance the chances 
for the survival (and flourishing) of Homo sapiens and other sentient species. I outline a 
conceptual framework, derived from empirical findings and theoretical developments in 
the bio-cultural sciences of religion, which can help clarify why and how gods are 
imaginatively conceived and nurtured by ritually engaged believers. Finally, I discuss the 
role that “adaptive atheism” might play in responding to the crises of the Anthropocene. 
Keywords: evolution; bio-cultural study of religion; cognitive science; atheism; 
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1. Introduction 
In one sense—and, indeed, in the one sense that is perhaps most obvious and yet at the same time 
easiest to disavow—none of us are going to survive the Anthropocene. We are all going to die. This is 
just the way it goes with organisms. Nevertheless, many of us, quite naturally, would prefer it if at 
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least a selection of human offspring could continue multiplying and filling the earth. This preference 
itself is a result of natural selection. The problem, of course, is that the earth is already too full and it is 
not at all clear how long it can sustain expanding multitudes of Homo sapiens. For several decades, a 
growing number of scientists, policy-makers and cultural commentators have been trying to draw our 
attention to imminent ecological crises, explaining their causes and estimating their effects on the 
survival of humanity and other sentient species [1,2]. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of people find such explanations and estimations all too easy to 
ignore. Rather than offering yet another summary of reasons to be alarmed, I want to focus here on 
some of the reasons why so many people—especially religious people—show surprisingly little alarm 
when given information about the deteriorating environment of the Anthropocene. My goal is to unveil 
some of the naturally evolved religious biases whose covert operation facilitates the repression or 
rejection of warnings about the consequences of extreme climate change and excessive capitalist 
consumption. Learning how to contest these phylogenetically inherited and culturally fortified biases is 
an important condition—indeed, perhaps a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition—for adapting to 
and altering our current natural and social environments in ways that will enhance the chances for the 
survival (and flourishing) of our offspring. 
I do not mean to downplay the significance of other factors (nutritional, pedagogical, political, 
economic, etc.) that must figure into our pragmatic adaptive calculations. My point is that highlighting 
and warning people about these issues will do little good if we fail to deal with deeply embedded 
religious biases that surreptitiously shape the reactions of the majority of the human population, 
enabling most of us to immediately dismiss or disregard such calculations. As we will see below, the 
evolved defaults that are most relevant for our purposes have to do with mental credulity toward 
religious content and with social congruity in religious contexts. These cognitive and coalitional biases 
are reciprocally reinforcing, and predispose most of us toward believing claims about the manifestation 
of gods (revelation) especially when engaging with other in-group members in the manipulation of gods 
(ritual). In other words, superstitious inferences based on the detection of alleged supernatural agents 
activate segregative preferences based on the protection of allied supernatural groups (and vice versa). 
This Special Issue of the journal is dedicated to exploring the role that “religions” might have 
played—and might continue to play—in exacerbating or easing the current ecological crises that 
characterize the Anthropocene. In a recent interview with the New Scientist about his book The 
Meaning of Human Existence, E. O. Wilson said that he thought religion is “dragging us down”, and 
that, “for the sake of progress the best thing we could possibly do would be to diminish, to the point of 
eliminating, religious faiths” [3]. In the final section of this article, I return to Wilson’s concerns and 
discuss the role that what I call “adaptive atheism” might play in responding to the crises of the 
Anthropocene. The third and fourth sections outline a conceptual framework, derived from empirical 
findings and theoretical developments in the bio-cultural sciences of religion, which can help clarify 
why and how gods are imaginatively conceived and nurtured by ritually engaged believers. 
First, however, when reflecting on claims like Wilson’s, which seem to be increasing in frequency 
in recent years, it is important to be as clear as we can about our use of terms like “religious faiths” and 
the reasons why we think they might be “dragging us down”.  
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2. Climate Change, Cultural Cognition and “Religion” 
As readers of this journal know all too well, the label “religion” is highly contested within and 
across the many academic disciplines that study the various phenomena to which the term is 
commonly applied [4]. In this context, I use the word religion to designate shared imaginative 
engagement with axiologically relevant supernatural agents. I explain and defend this stipulated 
definition in Section 3. Of course, this aggregate of traits does not capture everything that can be said 
about “religion”, but this sort of definition is relatively common in fields such as the cognitive science 
of religion [5,6]. Critics of Wilson—like critics of the new atheists—are quick to point out that 
“religions” have helped hold societies together, provided people with a sense of meaning in life, 
fostered the production of great works of music and art (and so on). This is no doubt true, and I am all 
for cohesive societies, meaningful lives and aesthetic productivity (and so on). But do any of these 
things depend on widespread belief in and ritual interaction with disembodied intentional forces that 
are watching over particular in-groups? 
We should be happy to discover that they do not. Why? Because, as we will see in Section 4, 
whatever else “religions” may produce, they also reinforce evolved biases that consistently lead to 
mistaken interpretations of natural phenomena and foster antagonism toward out-groups. Moreover, as 
we will see in Section 5, learning to contest these biases can help produce more plausible explanations 
of causal forces in the world and more feasible social strategies in pluralistic contexts. It is indeed true 
that other traits often found among people associated with a particular “religion”, such as a concern for 
justice or a sense of wonder, may indeed help to encourage creative interventions in socio-cultural 
practices and political economic systems. In what follows, however, my focus is on the reproduction of 
religion (in the sense stipulated above) in human minds and cultures, and the extent to which it 
aggravates the crises of the Anthropocene. 
Experts on climate change, as well as public-policy makers concerned with mediating their findings 
to the general public, have often expressed astonishment at the resistance so many people have toward 
accepting the scientific consensus. Equally troubling is the lack of environmentally sensitive behavior 
even among those who are well educated about and explicitly accept that consensus. These concerns 
have been the focus of a growing number of studies during the last decade or so. In their 2002 article, 
“Mind the Gap: Why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental 
behavior?”, in Environmental Education Research, Kollmuss and Agyeman [7] tackled the issue from 
the point of view of environmental education, summarizing much of the extant literature and arguing 
for a more complex model of “pro-environmental consciousness” that takes into account both external 
factors (e.g., demographics) and internal factors (e.g., values). In 2011 a Special Issue of American 
Psychologist was devoted to exploring ways in which scholars and practioners in the discipline of 
psychology might help foster healthy modes of coping with the crisis and contribute to a better 
understanding of the barriers to action [8]. 
One of the most important recent developments in this multi-disciplinary analysis of human 
responses to climate change has been the incorporation of insights from the cognitive and evolutionary 
sciences. In a recent review of the “foundational processes” that influence beliefs about climate 
change, M. Brownlee and colleagues [9], examined the way in which cognitive dissonance, biased 
assimilation, confirmation bias, loss aversion, illusions of optimism—and a host of other cognitive 
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biases—shape people’s attitudes and beliefs about climate change, and identified ways in which this 
knowledge could lead to new strategies in environmental education and research. In a similar study on 
various methodological scenario approaches to climate change research in Synthese, Lloyd and 
Schweizer showed how even some of the most popular models among scientists and policy-makers can 
be impacted by many of the heuristic biases that have been identified by cognitive psychology, such as 
availability, overconfidence and groupthink [10]. 
In his article “Why do people misunderstand climate change? Heuristics, mental models and 
ontological assumptions” in Climatic Change, Chen pointed out the special role of “object bias” in 
skewing interpretations of ecological crises [11]. The static mental models associated with the most 
common pattern matching heuristics that shape human perception and interpretation work extremely 
well for dealing with objects. Climate change, however, is not an object; it is a dynamic process. 
Unfortunately, when people uncritically use their implicit ontological assumptions about objects to try 
and make sense of (or predict) changes in complex dynamic systems, they consistently and profoundly 
fail. Chen notes that some physics teachers have developed a radical pedagogical approach to deal with 
this bias: they begin with detailed discussions of ontology before trying to teach novice students about 
physical processes (like electricity). He suggests that a similarly revolutionary approach might be 
necessary for making progress in altering people’s attitudes toward the processes of climate change. 
These sorts of insights have major implications for understanding the science/policy divide and the 
common sorts of misjudgments that shape reactions to policy proposals. As Norman and Delfin have 
pointed out in a recent issue of Politics & Policy, cognitive biases are easily activated under conditions 
of uncertainty and when individuals are trying to assess threats to their survival. They illustrate some 
of the ways in which cognitive biases like anchoring, framing, false representativeness, availability, 
attention to intentionality, and affective forecasting lead to systematic errors in judgment, and bad 
policy decisions [12]. In a similar study in Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 
Preston and colleagues examined the role of heuristic biases in “adaptation discourse”, which all too 
easily lead to ways of framing the problems, and to policy proposals for solving them, that rely on 
affective (quick, innate) reasoning processes rather than analytic (slow, methodical) reasoning [13]. 
Increasingly, scholars in these fields are recognizing the extent to which cognitive biases help to 
explain resistance to the scientific consensus about climate change and the relative lack of success in 
policies aimed at promoting pro-environmental behavior. 
In their analyses of these issues, Kahan and his colleagues utilize the phrase “cultural cognition”, by 
which they mean to refer to “the psychological disposition of persons to conform their factual beliefs 
about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to their cultural evaluations of the activities 
subject to regulation” ([14], p. 149–50). Cultural cognition is driven by implicit mechanisms like naïve 
realism and reactive devaluation, which reinforce people’s tendencies to immediately judge new 
information as unreliable when it goes against their culturally congenial beliefs or to dismiss the 
persuasiveness of evidence when it is offered by members of an out-group. Human beings do not 
naturally think in terms of Bayesian probabilities; rather, they are prone to process information in ways 
that confirm their affective orientation, based on prior estimations of risk perception, which makes it 
all too easy to ignore “experts” whose claims raise challenges to their sense of identity and idealized 
form of social ordering ([15], p. 168; cf. [16]). 
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What does any of this have to do with “religion”? In recent years, scholars of climate change have 
increasingly turned their attention to the relationship between religiosity, religious affiliation and even 
specific religious ideas, on the one hand, and attitudes toward (and behavior in response to) reports 
about ecological challenges and dangers, on the other. In a 2009 article in Global Environmental 
Change, Mortreux and Barnett reported on their interviews with the inhabitants of the islands of 
Tuvalu, where raising water levels might be considered a good reason to migrate. When people were 
asked why they did not move, they “consistently referred to the biblical story of Noah as evidence that 
God would not allow further flooding” ([17], p. 100). In his 2013 report on a case study of the role of 
religion in the Brazilian Amazon published in Journal of Rural Studies, Otsuki concludes that one 
consequence of the popularity in rural areas of the Pentecostal Church of Assembly of God, which 
embraces an evangelical Christian message of enjoying earthly prosperity, “was continual conversion 
of forests into municipalities and promotion of capitalist accumulation” ([18], p. 418). 
Experimental evidence suggests that people who are less religious and more analytic tend to be 
better (on average) at contesting some of the general cognitive and coalitional biases we have been 
discussing [19,20–22]. But are they any different from religious people when it comes to evaluating the 
scientific consensus on climate change and reacting to the challenges of the Anthropocene? In a recent  
survey-analysis examining the relation between “place attachment and ideological beliefs” and 
attitudes toward climate change, Devine-Wright and colleagues found that those with the strongest global 
attachments were more likely to be “female, younger and self-identify as having no religion” ([23], p. 68). 
Hope and Jones studied and compared groups of Christians, Muslims and secular people in a mixed 
methods analysis of the impact of religious faith on attitudes toward environmental issues. In their 
report on the study in a 2014 article published in Technology in Society, they attributed the low 
perception of urgency toward ecological crises among the former two groups as “due to beliefs in an 
afterlife and divine intervention”. Lack of these beliefs among secular participants, on the other hand, 
contributed to a “focus on human responsibility and the need for action” ([24], p. 48). 
But, some defenders of “religion” may object at this stage, is it not the case that some religious 
people do believe in caring for the earth and do act in environmentally friendly ways? Indeed, research 
indicates that religiosity can sometimes have a moderating effect on the likeliness to engage in 
sustainable behaviors. For example, in a cross-cultural comparison of Christian, Atheist and Buddhist 
consumers in the U.S. and South Korea, Minton and colleagues found that highly religious Buddhists 
were the most likely to engage in sustainable behaviors [25]. An earlier study by Wardekker and 
colleagues, which explored the role of “Christian voices” in the United States public debate over 
climate change, identified three distinct types of narrative: conserving the “garden of God” as it was 
created, tending to the wilderness so that it becomes the “garden” it should be, and a combination of 
these two in which God’s creation is considered both good and changing. The authors of that study 
concluded that “religious framings” of climate change could serve as “bridging devices for bipartisan 
climate-policy initiative” because of the way they resonate with many conservative and progressive 
members of the electorate ([26], p. 512). 
If our primary concern is dealing with the underlying credulity and congruity biases that impair our 
ability to respond to contemporary ecological crises, then there at least two important problems with 
the sort of analysis represented by these last two studies. By focusing theoretically only on institutional 
“affiliation” or on intensity of “ideological” commitment, this kind of approach ignores those aspects 
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of religion that are most relevant for understanding people’s resistance to facing the global challenges 
of pluralistic human societies in the Anthropocene, namely, shared imaginative engagement with 
invisible agents who are allegedly invested in upholding the norms and ensuring the survival of a 
particular in-group. However, this is precisely why cognitive and coalitional biases keep working so 
well—because they are ignored. 
And so we also have a pragmatic problem. Even if religiously affiliated and committed individuals 
explicitly accept the scientific consensus on climate change and act publically in environmentally 
friendly ways, insofar as they (and their affines) are also implicitly activated by evolved defaults that 
engender conceptions of person-like, coalition-favoring disembodied spirits whose intentions are 
allegedly relevant for interpreting natural phenomena and normatively inscribing the social field, they 
are actually strengthening the very biases that are contributing to the crises they are trying to solve. 
3. Homo deiparensis 
One of the distinctive features of our species is a fascination with naming ourselves. We are, or so 
we like to claim, Homo sapiens (the wise hominid). Of course, wisdom is not the only interesting thing 
about us; we have also nominated ourselves Homo faber (the worker), Homo ludens (the laugher) and 
Homo economicus (the shopper). In this context, I want to draw attention to another distinctive feature 
of our species: our tendency to bear gods. Research in fields as diverse as cognitive science, 
evolutionary biology, archaeology, experimental psychology and cultural anthropology has converged 
in recent years in support of the claim that conceptions of supernatural agents are easily “born” in 
human minds and “borne” in human groups today as a result of biases that were naturally selected in 
the early ancestral environment of the Upper Paleolithic [4,27–31]. 
In other words, we are—or we have been for at least the last 70,000 years or so—god-bearing 
hominids (Homo deiparensis). In the sense I am using the term, religion is the result of the integration 
of inherited cognitive and inculcated coalitional mechanisms that predispose us toward over-detecting 
human-like forms in the natural environment and over-protecting group-specific norms in complex 
social environments. The coordinate grid in Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework for discussing 
the possible correlations between—and contestations of—these perceptive and affiliative biases. 
The horizontal line represents a spectrum on which one can mark the tendency of a person to guess 
“hidden agent” when confronted with ambiguous phenomena. Anthropomorphically promiscuous 
individuals jump at any opportunity to postulate human-like entities as causal explanations even—or 
especially—when this requires appealing to counterintuitive disembodied intentional forces (i.e., to 
“supernatural agents”). Anthropomorphic prudes, on the other hand, resist superstitious interpretations 
of nature and hold out for non-intentional explanations. The vertical line plots the variation among 
individuals in relation to their tendency to prefer the norms of their own in-groups when evaluating 
ways to organize the social field. Sociographic prudes are happy to stay home with familiar others and 
are highly suspicious of the alien values of out-groups. The sociographically promiscuous, on the other 
hand, are more open to dating other cultures; they tend to resist appeals to conventional authorities that 
enforce segregative inscriptions of society. 




Figure 1. Theogonic Forces. 
The integration of anthropomorphic promiscuity and sociographic prudery served our ancestors well 
in an environment where survival depended on quickly perceiving any predators or prey, and 
consistently defending the resources and values of one’s in-group. Shared imaginative engagement 
with axiologically relevant supernatural agents—religion—powerfully reinforced these biases and 
gave a survival advantage to hominid groups whose members had this aggregate of traits. The 
integration of theogonic (god-bearing) mechanisms, represented in the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, 
was an evolutionary winner. 
In more than one sense, gods were the “best guess” available to our early ancestors. Hypothesizing 
the presence of a “human-like agent”—even when there was no clear evidence that such an agent 
existed—was “best” because it provided further motivation to keep trying to detect hidden agents, 
which was necessary for survival. Given the importance of honing this hypersensitive disposition, it 
would have been better to keep believing that there might be animal-spirits or ancestor-ghosts in the 
forest than to guess that the cause of weird noises or movements was simply the wind or shifting 
shadows. Although these biases regularly triggered false positives, the guesses they produced were 
cognitively cheap and inferentially rich. Once the human mind thinks it has detected an intentional force, 
attributions of person-like qualities to the putative agent (e.g., “may be angry” or “wants something”) are 
easily triggered by other cognitive devices like mentalization and teleological reasoning. 
So, over-active cognitive defaults led to the mental appearance of god-concepts, but why did people 
keep socially entertaining them? Supernatural agents may be easily born in human minds, but it takes a 
village to raise them. The gods that stick around and become entangled within communal rituals are 
typically those that serve as “better guards”. As human groups get larger, it becomes more difficult to 
keep an eye on everyone and be sure that they are following the norms of the coalition. When the 
members of an in-group really believe in the existence and causal relevance of disembodied intentional 
forces who are interested in their behavior, and who have the power and desire to reward or punish 
them, they are more likely to follow the rules even if no other embodied human agents are watching. 
Especially when resources are low or under otherwise stressful conditions, the most competitive 
coalitions are those whose members are able to cooperate and remain committed to the group. It is 
easy to understand why self-serving tendencies in individual organisms have been naturally selected 
over time. However, the societies in which individual human beings live, and on which they depend 
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for survival, will fall apart if there are too many self-serving cheaters, freeloaders or defectors. 
Research in the bio-cultural sciences of religion suggests that cooperative commitment within some 
hominid coalitions during the Upper Paleolithic was improved by the intensification of shared belief in 
and ritual engagement with potentially punitive gods [32–36]. Vindictive supernatural agents would be 
able to catch misbehavior that natural agents might miss, and could punish not only the miscreants, but 
also their offspring or even the entire community. Accepting the existence of invisible or ambiguously 
apparitional “watchers” helps to enhance the motivation to obey conventional regulations and stay 
committed to the in-group. 
Most of us are relatively sure that we know where babies come from, and have a pretty good idea of 
why adults usually want to keep them around. What about gods? Confidence about our ability to 
explain the processes that engender the arrival (and support the nurture) of disembodied intentional 
forces within the mental and social space of human life has been growing rapidly among scientists in 
the disciplines that make up bio-cultural study of religion. The integrated theogonic (god-bearing) 
forces represented in Figure 1 continue to play a role in the reproduction of religion in contemporary 
cultures because shared belief in the manifestations of gods and shared commitment to their ritual 
manipulation are the result of inherited inferential and preferential default mechanisms that are widely 
distributed in each new generation of human beings. 
So, what does any of this have to do with the Anthropocene, and the ecological and economic crises 
we face today as a species? The problem is that these religious credulity and congruity biases, which 
served our ancestors well, are no longer adaptive in some of the contexts within which a growing 
number of us find ourselves. Most of us do not live in relatively homogenous small-scale groups, 
hunting and gathering across wide expanses like the African savannah, but in pluralistic, densely-packed, 
large-scale societies rapidly running out of agricultural resources for supporting our expansive 
sedentation. The hyper-active detection of supernatural agents and the hyper-active protection of 
supernatural groups helped earlier human civilizational forms emerge and hold together, but it now 
seems like we must learn to contest these evolved defaults if we are to adapt to (and alter the 
conditions of) the Anthropocene. 
If large numbers of the population interpret natural phenomena like tsunamis and hurricanes as acts 
of God (literally), they are less likely to pay attention to scientific reports about climate change. Why 
worry about the planet if the supernatural agent of one’s in-group is going to create a new heaven and a 
new earth anyway? If large numbers of the population are motivated to inscribe the social field in ways 
that enforce the values putatively revealed by their God to elite members of their coalition, they are 
less likely to alter their patterns of consumption. Why worry about unequal distribution of resources 
today if one expects a supernatural agent to return at any moment with eternal rewards for the in-group 
and eternal punishment for the “wicked”? 
At this stage, some defenders of “religion” may once again protest. They do not believe such things, 
nor do any of their educated friends. They are deeply concerned about climate change and capitalist 
consumption and so are most of their cosmopolitan colleagues. Their conception of “God” promotes 
neither superstition nor segregation. Even if the latter were true it would, unfortunately, be irrelevant. 
Cross-cultural psychological research indicates that no matter what the intellectual elite and priestly class 
of a religious in-group says, the vast majority of regular believers immediately default to the naturally 
evolved biases toward detecting person-like, coalition-favoring gods when faced with real-life religious 
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scenarios [37–39]. As if this were not bad enough, these evolved cognitive and coalitional mechanisms 
are so deeply intertwined that mental credulity about gods and ritually enhanced social congruity 
constantly strengthen one another, implicitly and somewhat automatically, all too easily obscuring and 
promoting the powerful biases that skew our readings of and reactions to problems like climate change. 
4. The Reciprocity of God-Bearing Biases 
In other words, anthropomorphic promiscuity and sociographic prudery are reciprocally 
reinforcing. This is one of the central tenets of theogonic reproduction theory [4,27,40,41]. The fact 
that—and the ways in which—these biases are mutually intensifying continues to be confirmed and 
clarified by proliferating empirical research and theoretical developments in the many fields that 
contribute to the bio-cultural study of religion. Implicitly activating people’s anxiety about their own 
mortality, or the welfare of their kith and kin, increases their tendency to interpret ambiguous 
phenomena as caused by potentially punitive disembodied agents; conversely, priming individuals 
with thoughts about possible invisible watchers reinforces their tendency to protect their in-group and 
express antagonism toward out-group members [42,43]. I analyze this literature more extensively 
elsewhere [44], but in this context I limit myself to just a few recent examples from the rapidly 
growing multi-disciplinary literature that demonstrates the reciprocal reinforcement of theogonic  
(god-bearing) biases. 
In a 2012 article in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Gervais and Norenzayan 
presented evidence from three experimental studies for what they call the “supernatural monitoring 
hypothesis: That thinking of God triggers the same psychological responses as perceived social 
surveillance” ([45], p. 298). Psychologists have known about the association between socially 
desirable responding and religiosity for quite some time, but priming experiments provide a way to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between them. Their studies, which used by both explicit and 
implicit methods for priming concepts of God, confirmed their hypothesis that thinking about 
supernatural agents activates sensitivity to reputational cues that others are watching and causes an 
increase in behaviors considered socially acceptable—especially among believers. As the authors point 
out, these experiments also lend credence to the claim that supernatural agent concepts, once they arise 
in a culture, may “foster cooperative behavior by making religious believers feel as if they are 
monitored by their gods” ([45], p. 302). 
Cooperative behavior has rather obvious survival benefits, so what is the problem? The problem is 
that the dark side of in-group cohesion is out-group antagonism. The correlation between religion and 
prejudice has also been well-known and documented for decades by social psychologists, but more 
recent experiments in cognitive psychology have shed light on the mechanisms that link them. In a 
study of Singaporean Christians and Buddhists published in 2014 in The International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion, Ramsay and colleagues found that participants who were primed with 
concepts or images related to supernatural agency tended to become more prejudiced and antagonistic 
toward out-groups. Members of both religious traditions demonstrated more negative pretest to posttest 
attitude change toward homosexuals when primed with religious in-group words, in comparison with 
those primed with neutral words. Even when there is no explicit religious value-violation, bias toward 
culturally relevant out-groups increases when believers are primed with religious concepts. The 
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authors concluded that religion may exert its prejudicial effects “indirectly through activation of 
associated cultural value systems” ([46], p. 1). 
In other words, anthropomorphic promiscuity promotes sociographic prudery (and vice versa). In a 
2014 article in Psychological Science, Neuberg and colleagues used data from the Global Group 
Relations project to investigate the relation between religion and intergroup conflict among 194 groups 
in 97 sites across the world. Their goal was to discover the extent to which religious infusion, that is, 
the extent to which religious rituals and discourse permeate the everyday activities of groups and their 
members, “moderated the effects of two factors known to increase intergroup conflict: competition for 
limited resources and incompatibility of values held by potentially conflicting groups.” They found that 
when religion was infused within group life, “groups were especially prejudiced against those groups that 
held incompatible values, and they were likely to discriminate against such groups” ([47], p. 198). The 
evolved default toward protecting one’s own in-group by antagonizing out-groups is easily activated 
when one’s mental and social worlds are filled with messages about and ministrations toward watchful 
supernatural agents. 
In a 2014 study published in Psychiatry Research, Reed and Clarke demonstrated the effect of 
religious context on the content of visual hallucinations in individuals high in religiosity. Perceptual 
experiences in the absence of external stimuli—that is to say, hallucinations—are usually associated 
with schizophrenia or similar mental conditions, but they actually occur quite commonly in large parts 
of the population. Using a subliminal prime methodology (word-detection task), the authors found that 
“participants measuring high on religiosity were more likely to report false perceptions of a religious type 
than participants low on religiosity.” Both religious and non-religious participants (none of whom were 
schizophrenic) made false perceptions based on priming, but those who were high in religiosity produced 
more false perceptions with a religious content; in other words, their hallucinations were more likely to be 
related (directly or indirectly) to the supernatural agents of their in-group. The authors hypothesize that 
“context becomes a framework for processing through which context-relevant information or response to 
stimuli is facilitated and context-irrelevant information is suppressed” ([48], p. 597). 
What happens to human brains when they regularly engage in religious rituals? In a 2013 target 
article in Religion, Brain & Behavior, Schjoedt and colleagues explored the ways in which religious 
interactions tend to deplete cognitive resources. They proposed a “resource model of ritual cognition in 
which collective rituals limit the cognitive resources available for the individual processing of religious 
events”, and demonstrated the way in which “rituals directly suppress and channel default cognition in 
order to facilitate the construction of collective memories, meanings, and values among ritual 
participants” ([49], p. 40). Rituals tend to be characterized by incomprehensible—or at least causally 
opaque—interactions. The perception of goal-demoted and causally opaque actions in rituals uses up 
participants’ cognitive resources, limiting their capacity to activate the usual executive systems that 
support critical analysis. Ritual practices deplete cognitive resources in such a way that people become 
more susceptible to the suggestions and narratives of religious authorities or ritual officers. Other studies 
suggest that ritual contexts even alter basic assessments about bodily and mental processes [50]. 
In a 2014 article in The Journal of Social Psychology, Riggio and colleagues described two  
self-report experiments designed to show how religiosity affects attributions of causality. Participants 
read a story about a hypothetical man (Chris) who had a heart attack, and then (depending on the 
version of the story) used either religiously or medically authorized behaviors to improve his health, 
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and either lived or died. When Chris used religious behaviors and lived, highly religious individuals 
attributed this outcome to God. However, when Chris used the same behaviors and died, these 
individuals showed a form of excuse-making the authors call a “God-serving bias”. Like the cognitive 
predisposition toward a self-serving bias, such attributions implicitly support the maintenance of 
strongly held beliefs (especially beliefs related to group identification and belonging) even in the face 
of contradictory evidence. The authors conclude that religious belief systems, which claim to have a 
supernatural basis, not only lead to “low-quality thinking but to dangerous thinking, especially because 
it is purposeful and motivated by emotional processes…such belief systems, in being defended, lead to 
extremes in thinking and behavior that are dangerous to all people” ([51], p. 509). 
In a 2013 article in the Israel Journal of Ecology & Evolution, Purzycki and Sosis proposed the idea 
of an “extended religious phenotype” ([52], p. 102), incorporating the two “central features” of 
religion: “the coupling of ritual behavior and supernatural agency attribution”. Belief in supernatural 
agents is possible because of evolved systems devoted to the detection and attribution of mental states, 
but this does not explain why people believe in the particular gods of their in-group. They suggest that 
the predictable variations found in religious content across cultures are a result of attempts to deal with 
particular problems posed by environmental challenges in specific niches. Religious systems evolve in 
response to the demands of their context, socio-ecological niches that they help to construct, using 
mechanisms such as costly signaling and shared belief in supernatural surveillance to maintain the 
cohesion of the system. An “adaptive religious system” only survives if its members become and 
remain emotionally and (in some sense) intellectually committed to it; ongoing ritual engagement 
plays an important role in fulfilling these conditions. “Ritual behaviors and religious beliefs exist in a 
feedback loop in which behaviors affect beliefs and beliefs affect behaviors” ([52], p. 103). 
In other words, religious credulity and religious congruity biases reinforce one another. Why is this 
relevant for understanding and responding to climate change? Because these deeply ingressed biases 
shroud the operation and amplify the effects of the other cognitive and coalitional biases we reviewed 
in Section 1, further distorting interpretations of (and decelerating reactions to) the ecological and 
economic crises of the Anthropocene. Educational, psychological and public-policy experts are coming 
to realize that communicating more (or even better) explicit information about these crises is not going 
to help as long as people’s perception of this information is implicitly biased. Unveiling and contesting 
heuristic mechanisms like anchoring, affective forecasting and self-serving bias is likely a necessary 
condition for the long-term success of any proposed solution to the kind of problems facing pluralistic, 
globalizing civilizations. However, even that monumental task is not likely to succeed unless and until 
the reciprocally reinforcing religious biases, which in many cases conceal and buttress those other 
generic mechanisms, are also unveiled and contested. 
Let us take the example of “solution aversion”. Campbell and Kay explored the function of this bias 
in the context of an analysis of the relation between ideology and motivated disbelief in a 2014 article 
in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. They reported on four experiments that studied 
the role of motivated reasoning (that is, rationalization processes that are implicitly shaped by biases 
outside of conscious awareness) in people’s attitudes or perceptions of climate change. The authors 
discovered that the source of the motivation to disbelieve scientific reports is not necessarily related to 
an aversion to the problem itself, but to an aversion to solutions popularly associated with the problem. 
The skepticism of many U.S. Republicans toward environmental science, for example, is partly a result 
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of a conflict between ideological values (preference for a free market) and the sorts of solutions 
typically proposed for dealing with climate change (like regulating the free market). The answer to the 
problem of skepticism about scientific claims, therefore, “is not to simply present the public with more 
or better data but to consider other motivating factors” ([53], p. 811). 
Biases like solution aversion are fortified and intensified by religious credulity and congruity. 
People who regularly engage in shared imaginative engagement with supernatural agents will 
implicitly perceive problems and proposed solutions through the lens of the axiological norms 
authorized by the supernatural coalitions to which they are committed. Because these norms are 
reinforced by ritual interactions that exhaust cognitive resources, promote anxiety about hidden 
punitive forces, and increase antagonism toward out-groups, it is hardly surprising that individuals 
strongly committed to religious in-groups sometimes find it difficult to acknowledge problems 
associated with the Anthropocene, much less to commit themselves to solutions that challenge their 
superstitious interpretations of natural causes and segregative inscriptions of the social field. 
It is encouraging to hear the arguments (and see the actions) of many “religious” people who are 
explicitly promoting the well-being of the environment and a fairer global distribution of wealth. 
Tragically, however, such efforts may be implicitly undermined by the way in which their participation 
in religion—shared imaginative engagement with axiologically relevant supernatural agents—reinforces 
deep biases toward anthropomorphic promiscuity and sociographic prudery in their fellow believers, 
thereby demoting the sort of critical reflections and cultural relations that are needed for surviving the 
Anthropocene. Nevertheless, there are some reasons for optimism. 
5. Adaptive Atheism 
The term atheism is almost as contentious and contested as religion. In this context, I am using the 
former to designate attempts to make sense of the world and to act sensibly in society without 
appealing to supernatural agents or authorities. This stipulated definition highlights the creative efforts 
of those who contest the evolved tendency to rely on imaginative engagement with gods (theōn) when 
dealing with socio-ecological challenges. Insofar as it generates new modes of axiological engagement 
within pluralistic societies that alter the conditions for critical theoretical discourse about—and 
creative behavioral responses to—threats facing the human race and other sentient species, atheism can 
be conceived as an adaptation (in the general sense) to a radically interconnected global environment. 
To put it even more positively, atheists enthusiastically embrace naturalism in their construction of 
causal explanations in the academic sphere and secularism in their proposals for normative inscriptions 
in the public sphere. 
Most varieties of naturalism share a resistance to the inclusion of disembodied intentional forces in 
interpretations of the evolving cosmos. No doubt some individual scientists continue to harbor 
superstitious beliefs, but qua scientists the vast majority are methodologically naturalistic in the sense 
that they exclude god-concepts from their scholarly hypotheses. Most varieties of secularism share a 
resistance to the inclusion of supernaturally authorized sectarian policies in prescriptions for 
organizing pluralistic societies. No doubt some individual civil leaders in complex, democratic 
contexts maintain membership in religious in-groups, but qua politicians a growing number are 
methodologically secularist in the sense that they exclude god-sanctioned commands from their 
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political proposals. Atheism, in the sense I am using the term, is the affirmation of metaphysical 
naturalism and metaphysical secularism: the most plausible hypotheses and the most feasible strategies 
are those that incorporate only axiological dynamics whose actual existence (or existential 
actualizability) are inter-subjectively and trans-communally contestable [4]. 
Segregative inscriptions based on superstitious interpretations of punitive gods are becoming more 
and more problematic in pluralistic, globalizing contexts. More and more people, and especially young 
people, are finding it increasingly easier to make sense of the cosmos and to act sensibly in society 
without appealing to supernatural agents as causal powers or moral regulators [54–57]. In other words, 
in many parts of the world we find a growing tendency toward anthropomorphic prudery and 
sociographic promiscuity. I refer to these tendencies as “theolytic” (god-dissolving) because of the 
way in which they weaken the god-bearing biases of religious credulity and congruity (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Theolytic Forces. 
In the contemporary academy, and in the daily lives of an increasing number of people, supernatural 
agents are no longer the “best guess” when it comes to explaining surprising phenomena. Scientists 
and (non-religious) philosophers are trained to become anthropomorphically prudish, to resist the 
temptation to automatically attribute intentionality to unknown causes. If something unexpected 
happens in a test tube during a laboratory experiment, a chemist is not likely to hypothesize that it was a 
“ghost”. If an inferential link seems to be missing in a chain of logical argumentation, a (non-religious) 
philosopher is not likely to accept the strategy of inserting a “god”. 
In many pluralistic societies today, supernatural agents no longer serve as “better guards”. 
Scandinavian countries, for example, are among the happiest and most successful in the world and yet 
are also ranked as the most secular and atheistic. In Living the Secular Life, Zuckerman reviews the 
survey data that demonstrates that when it comes to measuring factors like happiness, valuing 
motherhood, promoting peace and murder rates, the least theistic states come out far better than the 
most theistic states [58]. It seems that, at least under some conditions, democratically elected secular 
governments whose policy-making procedures are relatively transparent to their people, sponsor 
cooperative behavior at least as well as shared credulity about supernatural agents–without 
automatically activating the defense mechanisms of religious congruity biases. 
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Happily, sociographic promiscuity and anthropomorphic prudery are also reciprocally reinforcing [4]. 
The integration of these theolytic forces helps to unveil and challenge the evolved defaults of Homo 
deiparensis. It is important to remember why the tendencies to fantasize about invisible agents and to 
become fanatical when protecting one’s in-group are so common across human cultures—and so 
difficult to contest. These biologically evolved and socially bolstered defaults are widely distributed in 
the current human population because they provided survival advantage to our early ancestors during 
the Upper Paleolithic, enabling them to out compete other hominid coalitions. Like racist, sexist, and 
classist biases, religionist biases have helped hold together increasingly complex human societies 
throughout the Neolithic, axial and modern ages. Today, however, in the diverse, cosmopolitan niches 
in which most of us live, these attitudes and behaviors have become maladaptive. Moreover, they are 
contributing to the degradation of the global environment in which all of us live. 
As we noted at the beginning of this article, E. O. Wilson has recently claimed that religions are 
“dragging us down”, and so “for the sake of progress the best thing we could possibly do would be to 
diminish, to the point of eliminating, religious faiths”. In The Meaning of Human Existence, about 
which he was being interviewed when he made these comments, Wilson argued that: 
Human existence may be simpler than we thought. There is no predestination, no 
unfathomed mystery of life. Demons and gods do not vie for our allegiance. Instead, we 
are self-made, independent, alone, and fragile, a biological species adapted to live in a 
biological world. What counts for long-term survival is intelligent self-understanding, 
based upon a greater independence of thought than that tolerated today even in our most 
advanced democratic societies. ([59], p. 26). 
This is the sort of anthropomorphic prudery we have come to expect in reflective, scientific 
analysis, and the sort of sociographic promiscuity we have come to hope for in policy proposals for 
pluralistic contexts. But what would happen if “religious faiths” were eliminated? Is that even 
possible—or desirable? It seems more likely that shared imaginative engagement with supernatural 
agents (religion) will slowly dissolve as new generations find little or no use for this ancient adaptive 
strategy. But what will happen then? Of course, these are not the sorts of questions one can answer 
definitively in advance. We will have to figure it out together as we go along. If the analyses of 
Sections 1–4 above are correct, however, then it may be that one of the conditions for surviving the 
Anthropocene is figuring out relatively soon how to facilitate the contestation of religious credulity 
and congruity biases. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the academic discipline of theology can play an important role in this 
process [4,27]. This claim may surprise many readers, because most people are only familiar with the 
sacerdotal trajectory of theology, which in fact has dominated discourse within and among the west 
Asian monotheistic traditions. This trajectory is quite clearly compromised by evolved religious biases, 
having pressed anthropomorphic promiscuity to infinity and sociographic prudery to eternity with the 
conception of a supernatural Agent whose norms are the grounds for punishing (or rewarding) all 
Groups whatsoever. However, if we think of theology in the broadest sense as the critique and 
construction of hypotheses about the existential conditions for axiological engagement, then it is easier 
to discern this ancient discipline’s iconoclastic trajectory. The latter has certainly been the minority 
report in theology, but its proponents have consistently pressed toward anthropomorphic prudery 
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and/or sociographic promiscuity, challenging the logical coherence and/or practical implications of the 
idea of an infinite intentional Being—without giving up on the existential intensity of intentional 
engagement with natural infinities. Liberating these iconoclastic forces from the bio-cultural 
gravitational pull of religious biases is one good place to start. 
Shared imaginative intercourse with supernatural agents emerged over time as evolved hyper-sensitive 
cognitive tendencies led to mistaken perceptions, which slowly became entangled within erroneous 
collective judgments about the number of potentially punitive agents in the social field. Allowing the 
covert operation of these evolved biases to continue unchecked reinforces commitment to favored  
in-group superstitions and antagonistic out-group segregations. Of all the tasks that face humanity as 
we try to adapt to (and alter) the Anthropocene, one of the most difficult will be un-learning these 
deeply embedded, reciprocally reinforcing heuristic habits. 
One way to facilitate this process is to encourage people to have “the talk” about religious 
reproduction—especially with the younger Homo sapiens among us. When it comes to explaining 
where babies come from, and how much effort is required to take care of them, we know that waiting 
too long can have devastating effects. The behaviors that lead to sexual and religious reproduction can 
feel sensational to our bodies, but most people become quite sensitive when asked to bare their souls 
and talk about these feelings. All of this is completely natural. When discussing such intimate issues, it 
is important to be delicate—but it is also important to be direct. Having “the talk” about religious 
reproduction should involve more than simply explaining how “it” works. It is equally important to 
explain the socio-ecological consequences of “doing it”. We are not likely to find solutions to the 
global ecological and economic crises of the Anthropocene unless and until we learn how to accept our 
finitude and axiologically engage one another—intentionally and intensely—without bearing gods. 
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